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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although Plaintiffs introduce a myriad of different reasons why the Utah courts 
should exercise personal jurisdiction over a group of nonresident outside directors who 
have zero jurisdictional contacts with Utah, the gist of their appeal can be reduced to a 
single question: Can the Utah legislature pass a law that expands the jurisdictional reach 
of the Utah courts beyond the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution? 
The trial court correctly answered in the negative. It should be affirmed. 
Plaintiffs' jurisdictional theory relies on allegations of control person liability under Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) and their purported jurisdiction-conferring effects.1 However, 
the Utah legislature never intended § 61-1-22(4) to confer jurisdiction. Even had the 
legislature so intended, this section would at most provide a state law basis for personal 
jurisdiction and would not have any bearing on the separate and indispensable 
requirement that any assertion of personal jurisdiction by the courts of this state comply 
with the requirements of federal due process. The substitution of service provisions of § 
61-1-26 similarly provide only a state law basis for jurisdiction, and do not of themselves 
satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment. 
All statutory references are to the Utah Code Ann., unless otherwise noted. 
1 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Bonds, Their Issuance, And The Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Plaintiffs are ten non-resident institutional investors who allegedly purchased 
revenue refunding bonds issued by Tooele County in a July 1, 1997 bond offering.3 RA 
022. These Pollution Control Refunding Revenue Bonds were issued by Tooele County 
under an Indenture of Trust between Tooele County and U.S. Bank. RA 022, 0646-48, 
0653. BancAmerica Securities, Inc., was the placement agent. RA0655. Tooele County 
had a loan agreement with Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. ("LES"), whereby the 
bond proceeds were loaned to LES. RA 022. Toole County assigned to U.S. Bank its 
rights to receive loan payments. RA 0647-48, 0650-51. The bonded indebtedness was 
not secured by any LES assets. RA 0647-48. 
LES resulted from the May 1997 merger of Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. 
("Rollins"), and a subsidiary of the Canadian company Laidlaw, Inc. ("Laidlaw"). RA 
020. In May 1998, LES merged with Safety-Kleen Corporation and the new company 
continued as Safety-Kleen. RA 020. 
MFS Series Trust III, Eaton Vance Distributors, Inc., John Hancock Funds, Inc. and 
Putnam Investments, Inc. are domiciled in Massachusetts; T. Rowe Price Associates, 
Inc., is domiciled in Maryland; and Merrill Lynch High Yield Bond Fund, Inc., 
Muniholdings Fund, Inc., Merrill Lynch Municipal Bond Fund, The National Portfolio 
and Merrill Lynch Municipal Strategy Fund are domiciled in New Jersey. RA 021. 
3
 Citations to the Record On Appeal will appear as "RA ." As Appellants note, RA 
0644-0717, is a double-sided document in which only alternate pages have been 
paginated. Appellants reference the contents of non-numbered pages by citing to the 
page numbers between which the cited text may be found. See Brief of Appellants 
(hereinafter "BOA") at 6 n.4. In the interest of consistency, the outside director 
Defendants will follow suit. 
2 
B. The Defendants/Respondents 
The Defendants/Respondents fall into three groups. One group includes current or 
former "inside" directors (i.e., those also holding executive positions) of Safety-Kleen 
and/or its predecessors. These are Kenneth W. Winger, Paul R. Humphreys, Michael J. 
Bragagnolo, and Henry H. Taylor. RA 018-20. 
The second group consists of individuals who are both Laidlaw executives and 
current or former directors of Safety-Kleen and/or its predecessors. Laidlaw was a major 
shareholder of Safety-Kleen, and the majority shareholder of LES. RA 020. This group 
includes James R. Bullock, John R. Grainger, and Leslie W. Haworth. RA 019. 
A third group includes "outside" directors of Safety-Kleen and/or its predecessors 
(i.e., persons who did not hold management positions during the relevant period). RA 
018-19. Outside director Defendants Rollins, Jr., Rollins, Sr., and Tippie were outside 
directors of Safety-Kleen and LES, and had served in that same capacity at Rollins before 
the May 1997 formation of LES through the merger of Rollins and a Laidlaw subsidiary. 
RA 0162-64, 0168-70, 0177-79. Outside director Defendants Thomas and Wareham 
became outside directors of LES in June 1997 and continued their service with Safety-
Kleen. RA 0165-67, 0171-73. Outside director Defendant Wrenn became an outside 
director of LES in July 1997 and continued his service with Safety-Kleen.4 RA 0174-76. 
This brief is filed on behalf of the outside director Defendants. 
4
 Plaintiffs concede that there is no basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 
Defendant Wrenn, and do not appeal the trial court's ruling as to him. BOA at 10 n.6. 
3 
C. The Gravamen Of The Action 
Plaintiffs allege they bought and held bonds in reliance on false and misleading 
financial statements of Rollins, Laidlaw, and LES incorporated by reference in the July 
1997 Preliminary Offering Memorandum that was used to solicit purchase of the bonds. 
RA 011-12, 022. They say the bonds have become worthless. RA Oil. 
Plaintiffs condemn four accounting practices, yet their complaint specifically links 
most of these to specific Defendants other than the outside directors. First, they allege 
Defendant Kenneth W. Winger decided to reduce reserves for environmental liabilities, 
thereby increasing revenues. RA 015-16. Second, they allege the "useful lives" of 
certain assets were lengthened, affecting depreciation. RA 015. Third, they allege 
double-billing supposedly occurred, with the knowledge of Defendants Winger, 
Humphreys and Bragagnolo. RA 014-15. Fourth, they allege the insider Defendants 
maintained an inadequate accounting system. RA 013-14. 
These irregularities were allegedly discovered after the books were audited at the 
behest of outside director Tippie "due to Tippie's concerns about the Company's reported 
revenue." RA013. The audit found overstated revenue. As a result, top executives 
Winger, Bragagnolo, and Humphreys were placed on administrative leave pending 
investigation by a special committee of the Safety-Kleen board of directors, which 
included outside director Defendants.5 RA 012. Safety-Kleen's independent auditor, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, withdrew certain previously issued reports of financial 
4 
statements, and Safety-Kleen announced those statements would be restated. RA U12. 
Two months later, around May 30, 2000, Safety-Kleen missed debt payments totaling 
close to $60M. RA 011 On June 30, 2000, Safety-Kleen filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding, hi The botnl>, irin.iin m tk/Lmlf ami IIL|UUIII\ ha* n"all but \\\w<\ up " V/. 
D. The Suit And The Ruling On Motion To Dismiss 
Plaintiffs filed suit on inly 1, 2001, alleging five "counts": statuton \ ti-Litn ur, * -I 
§§61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(4), and three common law claims for fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation. On January 22, 2002, the outside director Defendants made a special 
appearance and filed a i i lotioi i to disn iiss foi lack of personal jurisdiction Eacl i outside 
director Defendant filed a sworn affidavit showing his lack of jurisdictional contacts with 
Utah. RA 165-79. These affidavits established that none of the outside director 
Defendants has ever lived in I Jtah, met or spoken with the Plaintiffs, or traveled to Utah 
to do business with the Plaintiffs. Id. None of them was served with the summons or 
complaint in Utah, none consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Utah courts. Id, 
Each outside director Defendant further attested that he did not "negotiate, structure, 
solicit, investigate, assist or in any way participate in the issuance of Polli ition Contt oil 
Refunding Revenue Bonds issued by Tooele County on July 1, 1997." Id. 
In considering the existence of personal jurisdiction, "[e]ach defendant's contacts 
with the forum State must be assessed individually." Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 
5
 Outside director Defendants Thomas and Wrenn assumed interim senior executive 
officer positions with Safety-Kleen in March 2000—following the resignations of Messrs. 
Winger, Humphreys and Bragagnolo~at the request of the Board. RA 165-67, 174-76. 
5 
(1984). To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiffs must 
make a prima facie showing that the court has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. 
Patriot Sys., Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320 (D. Utah 1998). 
Plaintiffs cannot make the requisite showing through the conclusory allegations of 
their complaint; it must be made by well-pled allegations of jurisdictional facts that are 
not controverted by defendants' supporting affidavits. Id. If defendants submit affidavits 
refuting the existence of contacts between themselves and Utah, contradictory allegations 
in a complaint hold no weight; plaintiffs must come forward with affidavits establishing 
the existence of specific jurisdictional contacts. Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. 
Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1121 (Utah 1992)(fmding that because defendant submitted an 
affidavit refuting jurisdictional facts and plaintiff did not submit a counter-affidavit "the 
facts asserted in the [defendant's] affidavit are taken as true and the facts recited in the 
complaint are considered only to the extent they do not contradict the affidavit"); 
Roskelley & Co. v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980) ("[Wjhen jurisdiction is 
challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction in its complaint in 
the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts those general 
allegations."); see Clements v. Tomball Ford, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 202, 205 (D. Utah 1993) 
("Where a defendant has specifically rebutted a complaint's jurisdictional allegations by 
affidavit, plaintiff cannot rely on those allegations, but must submit his own affidavits, 
depositions etc."). 
Rather than filing counter-affidavits attesting to the existence of jurisdictional 
contacts between any Defendant and Utah, the Plaintiffs merely tendered an affidavit 
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from their attorney. The principal office of this affidavit v\ ;is to attach A iopy nf (lie 1997 
Preliminary Offering Memorandum and the Loan Agreement between Tooele County and 
LES R A 0608-0721. These documents do not identify any actions taken by outside 
directoi Defendants 1 1 ic Pi elii :t tit lai y Offei ing Men 101 ai icii u i 11 i lei el/y idei itifies them as 
non-management directors of Safety-Kleen. RA 0682. Had Plaintiffs submitted counter-
affidavits attesting to jurisdictional facts, any factual conflicts in the affidavits would 
have been resolved in their In < n See Neways, Inc. v. McCausland, 950 P.2d 420, 422 
(Utah 1997); Anderson v. American Soc 'y Of Plastic And Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 
P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990). 
Plaintiffs argue this Court must accept the jurisdictional theories in their 
Complaint because Defendants did not addi ice affidavits rebi ltting their "jurisdictional 
claim." BOA at 15. However, Defendants submitted affidavits showing they had no 
jurisdictional contacts with Utah, and absolutely no involvement in the bond offering. 
Plaintiffs adduced no evidence showing any outside director involvement in the bond 
offering, the Preliminary Offering Memorandum, the financial statements incorporated in 
the Preliminary Offering Memorandum, or other subjects of Plaintiffs' complaint. There 
is no factual conflict in I lie documentary evidence, only Plaintiffs' naked jurisdictional 
theories. Jurisdictional theories hold no weight without jurisdictioi ia.1 contacts. 
Plaintiffs misdescribe the facts that were before the trial court, a grievous 
deficiency given the trial court's role as a fact finder. For example, Plaintiffs claim it is 
"undisputed" that the "securities were issued or caused to be issued in I ]ii)h bv I 1'S"" and 
that the "securities were offered and sold to [them] by way of false or misleading 
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statements." BOA at 18. But as the Preliminary Offering Memorandum that Plaintiffs 
themselves introduced into evidence makes clear, the securities were issued by Tooele 
County, not LES, and there is no evidence that LES "caused" the issuance. RA 0646-48. 
There is no evidence plotting the location where the securities were issued. There is no 
evidence fixing the location where Plaintiffs purchased the securities. None of the 
Plaintiffs is a Utah corporation. RA 021. There is no evidence any one of them has a 
Utah office. There is no evidence describing the manner in which the bonds were 
purchased, i.e., did Plaintiffs purchase bonds at the initial bond offering or later, in the 
secondary market.6 Indeed, there is no evidence that Plaintiffs received any financial 
statements, read them, or relied upon them. There is not even evidence that Plaintiffs 
received the Preliminary Offering Memorandum. 
Based on the jurisdictional facts adduced (or lack thereof), and Plaintiffs' failure 
to meet their burden of establishing a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction was 
6
 This would be significant because securities purchased in the secondary market would 
have little or no nexus with the circumstances surrounding the initial offering. Even 
assuming that the bonds were initially issued in Utah (for which there is no evidence), all 
of the potential jurisdictional contacts that one might consider arising from an initial 
offering in Utah, i.e., correspondence and contact with entities in Utah regarding the 
initial offering, business trips to Utah in connection with the initial offering, etc., would 
be irrelevant if the Plaintiffs' claims pertained to alleged fraud in connection with remote 
purchases in the secondary market. 
Furthermore, Plaintiffs' legal theory of jurisdiction turns on the assumption that 
they have made & prima facie case for liability under the Utah securities laws. Putting 
aside the patent deficiencies of such a theory, no prima facie case for liability can exist 
unless Safety-Kleen was the offerer or seller of securities, and unless there was privity 
between Safety-Kleen and the Plaintiffs. See infra Section IV.E.l. By failing to allege 
even the most basic circumstances of how they came to acquire these securities, and from 
whom, Plaintiffs have failed to make the prima facie case of liability upon which their 
jurisdictional theory is dependant. 
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appropriate, the trial court correctly granted Defendants' motion tci dismiss. 
The result below was foreshadowed by the rejection of Plaintiffs' jurisdictional 
theories in California. The allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint in Utah are a mirror-image 
of anothei eon iplaint Plan itiffs filed against these san le Defendants in California Superior 
Court in Sacramento, on March 5, 2001-asserting identical claims arising from the very 
same allegedly misleading financial statements, in connection with revenue refunding 
bonds issued by a California public entity. Just as in Utah, Plaintiffs sought to have the 
California courts exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendants w ilhoul am sli< iv\ nig 
of minimum contacts between each Defendant and California. 
The California trial court rejected Plaintiffs' theories, and was affirmed by the 
California Court of Appeals in Eaton Vance Distributors v. Grainger, No. C040158, 
2003 WL 1521896 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2003). These courts specifically rejected 
Plaintiffs' argument that California Corporation Code § 25504 (the California counterpart 
to § 61-1-22(4)) conferred jurisdiction oii the basis of control person liability: 
[T]he plaintiffs have impermissibly conflated two distinct concepts: 
liability and jurisdiction. . . . Liability depends on the relationship between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants; jurisdiction depends only upon each 
defendant's relationship with the forum. Although individual officers and 
directors may be jointly and severally liable under section 25504 for their 
corporation's securities fraud, jurisdiction over each defendant must still be 
established individually. Thus, a California court has jurisdiction only over 
those individual officers and directors who have personally established the 
requisite minimum contacts with California. 
Id. at 2003 WL 1521896, at *5 (citations omitted). I'lairitiffs also iinsuccessfully argued 
that substitution of service under California Corporations Code § 25550 (the California 
counterpart to § 61-1-26) was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction in the absence of 
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minimum contacts. Id. at *7-8. The California court squarely rejected this argument, 
stating that plaintiffs had confused the procedural requirement of effective service of 
process (as provided under § 25550) with the separate and indispensable requirement that 
a nonresident defendant must have minimum contacts with the forum state. Id. 
Plaintiffs have traveled from state to state seeking to topple the due process 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. They should find Utah no more hospitable 
than California in this regard. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court must review the trial court's ruling for "correctness." Arguello, 838 
P.2d at 1121. The trial court's ruling was correct and necessary in light of governing 
Utah law and the unflinching requirements of Constitutional due process. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, and the unequivocal rulings of this Court, require that Plaintiffs proffer 
jurisdictional facts establishing that each individual Defendant had minimum contacts 
with Utah. Each outside director Defendant submitted an uncontroverted affidavit 
attesting that he had no contact with the State of Utah and no involvement with the July 
1997 Safety-Kleen bond offering. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled, as it must, 
that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. 
The trial court's ruling is consonant with this Court's holding in D.A. v. State, 603 
P.2d 607 (Utah 2002), a case that Plaintiffs fail to cite anywhere in their brief. In D.A. v. 
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State, the Court held that a nonresident defendant mi ist 1 lave constiti itionall) -requii ed 
minimum contacts with Utah in every instance, regardless of the state law basis for 
personal jurisdiction. Thus, neither § 61-1-22(4) (control person allegations) nor § 61-1-
26 (substitu!*^ »f service) cai i ai ithorize persoi lal ji irisdiction in the absence of minimum 
contacts. Section 61-1-22(4) is particularly unsuitable for this task because Plaintiffs 
were never in privity with Safety-Kleen with respect to the bond offering (as is required 
to state & prima facie case under § 61-1-22(4)) and because § 61-1-22(4) was never meant 
to provide even a state law basis for personal jurisdiction. In essence, Plaintiffs seek to 
have the Utah courts exercise personal jurisdiction over these Defendants solely because 
they were board members of Safety-Kleen. The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit 
jurisdiction to be established on such ;tn .tttenuated basis. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Found That The Outside Director 
Defendants Did Not Have The Requisite "Minimum Contacts" 
With Utah To Permit The Exercise Of Personal Jurisdiction 
Utah courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents to the "fiillest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution." I Jtah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. The central inquiry is whether the exercise 
of jurisdiction comports with "traditional notions of fair play and silbstantial justice" as 
articulated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), and 
subsequent Supreme Court cases. Arguello, 838 P.2d at 1123. 
Personal jurisdiction may be general or specific. Plaintiffs proceeded before the 
trial court, and now on appeal, under the theory of specific jurisdiction. 
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B. Basic Principles Governing Specific Jurisdiction 
The exercise of specific jurisdiction depends upon the "quality and nature' of the 
minimum contacts [with Utah] and their relationship to the claim asserted." Id. at 1123 
(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319). In other words, plaintiffs' claims must 
"arise[] out of some contact defendants] [have] with the forum state, some action taken 
by the defendants] by which it can be shown that defendants] [have] 'purposefully 
availed [themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.'" 
Roskelley, 610 P.2d at 1311 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
Purposeful availment means an "an action of the defendant[s] purposefully directed 
toward the forum state." SIIMegadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp., 969 
P.2d 430, 437 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior 
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)). If a plaintiff proves facts allowing the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction, the court must still consider whether the exercise of jurisdiction is 
reasonable. SII Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 435-36 (citing Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, All U.S. 462, 478 (1985)). If it is not, jurisdiction will not be established. 
Id. 
Jurisdiction cannot rest on the fact that Utah is affected by the actions of the 
defendant in another place. A defendant must personally act in a way that is expressly 
aimed at, and foreseeably causes injury in, Utah. Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
Utah must be the "focal point of the tort and its harm." Hydro Engg, Inc. v. Landa, Inc., 
231 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1135 (D. Utah 2002). A purely financial injury to Utah residents 
is not sufficient to create jurisdictional contacts. Far West Capital, Inc. v. Towne, 46 
12 
F.3d 1071, 1078-80 (lOlh Or, 1995) (naked allegations til" iiiianciai m|ui\ io I 'lain 
residents not sufficient to establish "minimum contacts"); Patriot Sys., ! 1 1 Supp ,\.l at 
1324 (personal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on purely financial injury caused by 
nonresident); Harnischfegger Eng'rs, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 608, 
613 & n.6 (D. Utah 1995) (recognizing that financial in jury to a I Itah i esident "has been 
flatly rejected by the Utah courts as a basis for exercising specific personal jurisdiction" 
and personal jurisdiction on that grounds would "likely violate federal due process"). 
This is even more forceful where, as liei e, Defendants are not being sued by Utah 
residents, but by out-of-state investors with no connection to Utah. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-22 ("[T]he public interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective 
means of redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal 
contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens . . . ." (emphasis added)); Asahi, 480 
U.S. at 114 (noting that a state's "legitimate interests" in a dispute are "considerably 
diminished" when the plaintiff is not a forum resident). 
Jurisdiction depends on the actions of the defendai it, not the i milateral actions of 
the plaintiff. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253 ("The unilateral activity of those who claim some 
relationship with the nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with 
the forum State."). Thus, even if Plaintiffs had or could have alleged that they pooled the 
bonds in a mutual fund under their control, and sold shares of this mutual mi •. i 
residents (of which there is no evidence), this would not suffice to create a jurisdictional 
contact between Utah and any Defendant. Far West Capital, 46 F.3d at 1078-80. 
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C. Actions Of The Corporation Are Not Attributable To The 
Outside Directors Because The Court Did Not Find That The 
Outside Directors Did Anything Related To The Allegations In 
This Case 
Plaintiffs do not even attempt to show that the outside directors personally did 
anything related to the allegations of the complaint. Attribution of a corporation's 
jurisdictional contacts to a director is only possible if plaintiffs prove the director 
participated in or directed the corporation's tortious actions, hence expressly aiming 
tortious activity at Utah and foreseeably causing harm in Utah. 
Plaintiffs rely on Seagate Tech. v. A.J. Kogyo Co., 219 Cal. App. 3d 696 (1990), a 
case that actually illustrates the flaws in their theory. BOA at 29. A nonresident officer 
or director who causes a corporation to commit torts in California may be sued in 
Californiaybr his acts and the corporation's jurisdictional contacts resulting from these 
torts may be imputed to the officer or director who caused them: 
An act taken by a corporate officer may subject the officer to in personam 
jurisdiction. The act must be one for which the officer would be personally 
liable and the act must in fact create contact between the officer and the 
forum state. (For example, no personal contact would result from doing 
nothing more than ratifying an act taken by the corporation or another 
corporate officer.) 
Id. at 703-04. Seagate does not sanction the imputation of corporation minimum contacts 
to individual directors in the absence of evidence showing the character and quality of 
the director's own individual acts. 
Thus, Seagate is of no help to Plaintiffs, absent evidence that each outside director 
Defendant took affirmative acts aimed at Utah.7 See Ten-Mile Indus. Park v. Western 
7
 Plaintiffs also cite to United States Liability Insurance Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 
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Plains Serv. Corp., 810 F.2d i318, 1527 (10th Cir. 196/; J / J I / sdictioi i ovei the 
representatives of a corporation may not be predicated on jurisdiction over the 
corporation itself, and jurisdiction over the individual officers and directors must be 
based on theii if idi1 ' licit lal contacts witl i it le I on n i i state."); Wegererv. First Commodity 
Corp., 744 F.2d 719, 727 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Jurisdiction over the individual officers of a 
corporation, however, may not be obtained merely by accomplishing jurisdiction over the 
corporation."); National Petroleum Mktg.y Inc. v. Phoenix Fuel Co., 902 F. Supp. 1459, 
1469 (D. Utah 1995) ("[EJmployee contacts with a ji n isdiction 'are not to be judged 
according to their employer's activities there.'")(quoting Colder, 465 U.S. at 790)); 
accordLeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., 814 F. Supp. 820, 825 (N.D. Cal. 1992) 
("There is no evidence of any purposeful action takeii by this defendant either in or 
directed at California which is in any way connected with the fraud alleged in this action. 
Plaintiffs seek to establish personal jurisdiction over this individual on nothing more than 
his corporate title."); Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp., Ill Cal. App. 3d 103, 114 (1990) 
(holding that outside directors of a foreign corporation did not have sufficient contacts for 
personal jurisdiction when there was "no evidence that they participated in or directed 
any tortious conduct or omission either within or without California"). 
Cal. 3d 586 (1970), although this case does not address personal jurisdiction at all. 
Haidinger-Hayes merely stands for the unremarkable proposition that a director of a 
corporation may be liable for his own tortious conduct. Id. at 595. 
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D. Personal Jurisdiction Under Utah Law, And The Case Of D.A. v. 
State 
In past years, this Court has balanced the interplay of Utah personal jurisdiction 
law and federal due process through a number of different formulations. In some 
instances, this Court has applied a three-pronged test, the first two prongs addressing the 
requirements of the Utah long-arm statute, and the necessary third prong addressing the 
requirements of federal due process. E.g., Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 8 
P.3d 256, 260 (Utah 2000). Other cases have reduced this formulation to a single tine: 
"[W]e frequently make a [federal] due process analysis first because any set of 
circumstances that satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm statute." SII 
Megadiamond, 969 P.2d at 433. 
With the December 20, 2002, case of D.A. v. State, 63 P.3d 607 (Utah 2002), this 
Court acknowledged the multitude of extant formulations and clarified that there was one 
unified test for assessing specific personal jurisdiction: 
First, the court must assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction 
over the nonresident defendant. This means that a court may rely on any 
Utah statute affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm 
statute. Second, assuming Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident defendant, the court must assess whether an assertion of 
jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Id. at 612; accord Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990)("There are two 
limitations on a court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant: the applicable state personal jurisdiction rule and the constitutional principles 
of due process."). Remarkably, Plaintiffs' opening brief does not even cite D.A. v. State, 
even though it is the leading Utah authority on the question presented, nor does it 
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anywhere acknowledge the two-prong jurisdictional inquiry that it establishes. 
This Court held that § 78-3a-l 10(3)8 was an alternative basis for jurisdiction, 
under state law, to the Utah long-arm statute in juvenile court proceedings. Although the 
Utah legislature explicitly authorized the exercise of personal jurisdiction for such 
proceedings under § 78-3a-l 10(3), this did not obviate the requirement that any assertion 
of jurisdiction must also comply with the requirements of federal due process. DA. v. 
State, 63 P. 3d at 613 ("Despite our conclusion that Utah law confers personal 
jurisdiction over DA., federal law nevertheless mandates that we consider whether 
exercising jurisdiction over her comports with the due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."). 
The ruling in DA. v. State highlights the fundamental flaw in Plaintiffs' theory of 
personal jurisdiction. They cast about for alternative theories of jurisdiction, whether 
through allegations of control person liability under § 61-1-22(4), see infra Section IV.E., 
or substitution of service under § 61-1-26, see infra Section IV.F. As is discussed below, 
these theories do not confer jurisdiction, even under Utah law. Even if they did, Plaintiffs 
have missed the all-important constitutional question. As the trial court found, the 
assertion of personal jurisdiction over these Defendants would violate federal due 
process. 
8
 Section 78-3a-l 10(13), confers jurisdiction over nonresident parents in Utah juvenile 
courts: "If the parents . . . cannot be found within the state . . . (c) [s]ervice of summons 
as provided in this subsection shall vest the court with jurisdiction . . . in the same manner 
and to the same extent as if the person served was served personally within the state." 
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E. The Theory Of Control Person Liability Is An Insufficient Basis 
To Establish Jurisdiction Over Individual Directors In This 
Case 
Plaintiffs try to evade the rule that a corporation's minimum contacts are not 
attributed to individual directors unless the plaintiffs prove the directors participated in or 
directed the corporation's acts. Plaintiffs contend that allegations of control person 
liability under § 61-1-22(4) of the Utah securities laws trigger jurisdiction in Utah 
courts. They say § 61-1-22(4) shifts to the Defendants the burden of showing their lack 
of involvement in securities law violations. Therefore, Plaintiffs say, they are relieved of 
the burden of proving the minimum contacts of a "control person" in response to a 
motion to dismiss. They say allegations of § 61-1-22(4) liability either establish 
jurisdiction or, at least, shift to Defendants the burden of proving lack of personal 
jurisdiction in Utah courts. BOA at 15-16. 
This argument has no merit. 
1. Assuming Well-Pled Allegations Of Control Person 
Liability Suffice To Establish Jurisdiction, They Are 
Facially Defective Here 
Plaintiffs'* argument fails because the complaint does not allege prima facie 
control person liability under § 61-1-22(4). Every count in Plaintiffs' complaint fails to 
state a viable or coherent cause of action given the requirements of § 61-1-22(4). 
Counts I and II cannot give rise to control person liability under § 61-1-22(4), 
9
 "Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable under 
Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or buyer,. . . are also 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless 
the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in exercise of reasonable case could not have known, of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4). 
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because the allegations of the complaint do not state prima facie primary liability under § 
61-1-22(1) (which creates a private remedy for violations of § 61-1-1). Liability under § 
61-1-22(1) only attaches to a person who actually "offers, sells, or purchases a security," 
and secondary liability to the control person under § 61-1-22(4) only to the same extent 
as the "seller or buyer." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(1), (4); Levitz v. Warrington, 877 
P.2d 1245, 1246 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Section 61-l-22(4)(a) makes a person liable 
only if buyers or sellers under his or her control are liable under Section 61-l-22(l)(a)."). 
Not only does liability under § 61-1-22(1) attach only to an actual seller, but this seller is 
liable only to "the person . . . buying the security from him." In other words, Plaintiffs 
must be in privity with Safety-Kleen in order to give rise to control person liability under 
§ 61-1-22(4). See Gohler, IRA v. Wood, 919 P.2d 561, 565-66 & n.6 (Utah 1996) 
(holding that there is no liability under section 61-1-22(4) unless plaintiff is in privity 
with seller). 
It is undisputed that Tooele County, not Safety-Kleen, was the issuer of the bond 
offering and BankAmerica Securities was the placement agent. RA 022, 0646-48, 0655. 
Although the complaint does not specify whether Plaintiffs purchased the bonds in the 
initial offering by Tooele County or in the after-market, they could not have purchased 
them from Safety-Kleen as Safety-Kleen (or any of its predecessor entities) never issued, 
owned or sold the bonds. Because Safety-Kleen itself is not liable under § 61-1-22(1), 
none of its alleged control persons can be liable under § 61-1-22(4). 
This requirement is exemplified by In re Diasonics Securities Litigation, 599 F. 
Supp. 447 (N.D. Cal. 1984), a case that construes the analogous control person statute 
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under the California securities laws. The court held that the corporation's officers and 
directors could not be subject to control person liability because the complaint failed to 
allege strict privity between the corporation and the plaintiffs. Id. at 459. The court 
reached this conclusion despite allegations that the officers and directors participated in 
preparing the registration statement, prospectus, and certain financing mechanisms for the 
initial offering. Id. at 458. Here, of course, Plaintiffs did not allege any participation by 
the outside directors in the subject matter of the complaint. 
The remaining counts (Counts III, IV, and V) in the complaint are common law 
fraud and negligence claims, and cannot possible give rise to control person liability 
because § 61-1-22(4) only imposes control person liability for statutory primary 
violations of the Utah Securities Act. 
Assuming that control person liability is material to the existence of jurisdiction, 
the complaint does not allege it. 
2. Prima Facie Allegations Of A Cause Of Action Are Not A 
Substitute For Evidence Proving Minimum Contacts 
There is no support in Utah law for either (a) dispensing with plaintiffs' burden of 
proving minimum contacts, or (b) testing jurisdiction by reference to whether a complaint 
sets out the prima facie elements of a cause of action. 
Allegations in support of a theory of liability are not facts discharging plaintiffs' 
burden of proving the minimum contacts of the defendants: 
If the court determines . . . that a defendant does not have sufficient 
minimum contacts with the forum, then its personal jurisdiction analysis 
ends without examining the plaintiffs causes of action. The laws on which 
the suit are based would be irrelevant because a state or federal statute 
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cannot transmogrify insufficient minimum contacts into a basis for personal 
jurisdiction by making these contacts elements of a cause of action, since 
this would violate due process. 
Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World 
Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 944 (7th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 532 U.S. 934 (2001) (rejecting an 
analogous attempt to establish personal jurisdiction by showing "control" liability under a 
federal statute); see also In re Daimler-Chrysler AG Sec. Litig., 197 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99 
(D. Del. 2002) (rejecting an attempt to premise personal jurisdiction on "control person" 
allegations under the federal securities laws because "[t]he Court cannot adjudicate the 
question of liability without first establishing whether the Court has jurisdiction over the 
parties"); Taylor-Rush, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 114 (rejecting argument that allegations 
of individual liability as "control persons" under the California securities laws could be 
the basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over three officers and directors because 
"[t]here is no evidence that they participated in or directed any tortious act or omission 
either within or without California."); Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 662 P.2d 553, 
563 (Kan. 1983) ("[T]he court must first have in personam jurisdiction [over non-resident 
director defendants] before the statutory liability [under the control person provisions of 
the Kansas securities laws] may be applied. Jurisdiction depends upon [long-arm statute] 
and the constitutional guarantees of due process."). 
Nor is it enough to argue that the requirements of constitutional due process are 
too burdensome, or violate public policy by making it more difficult to impose statutory 
liability against a particular nonresident: 
Even if [nonresident defendant] would be liable under [the Comprehensive 
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Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA")], 
[plaintiff] may not use liability as a substitute for personal jurisdiction. 
Even if the requirement of personal jurisdiction allows a parent corporation 
to avoid liability, and thus undercuts CERCLA's sweeping purpose to affix 
the ultimate cost of cleaning up these disposal sites to the parties 
responsible for the contamination, liability is not to be conflated with 
amenability to suit in a particular forum. Personal jurisdiction has 
constitutional dimensions, and regardless of policy goals, Congress cannot 
override the due process clause, the source of protection for non-resident 
defendants. 
American Tel & Tel Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir. 
1996) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Not only do Plaintiffs conflate jurisdiction and liability, but their theory of 
jurisdiction proves too much. Although Plaintiffs fault Defendants for failure to 
introduce documentary evidence rebutting their control person allegations, with the next 
breath they state that it is impossible to refute control personal liability-based jurisdiction 
in a motion to dismiss: 
In short, Appellees bear the burden of proving that they are not liable as 
control persons under the Utah securities laws. Absent doing so—involving 
a factual inquiry which would be premature at this stage of the 
proceedings—Defendants-Appellees must be presumed to have committed 
knowing acts within or having effects in Utah, including but not limited to 
directing LES' activities in connection with the issuance. 
BOA at 18 (emphasis added). In other words, according to Plaintiffs, the Utah courts can 
assert personal jurisdiction over every director of every company, anywhere in the world, 
so long as a plaintiff files an unverified complaint alleging control person liability under 
the Utah securities laws, and there is simply no evidence that the nonresident director can 
introduce to challenge this assertion of jurisdiction. Not only is such a theory without 
support under Utah law, but it plainly violates constitutional due process. 
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Plaintiffs misuse federal authority in their attempt to give the Utah courts an 
unconstitutional reach. However, each of the federal cases that Plaintiffs cite show that 
courts do not premise personal jurisdiction solely on naked allegations of control person 
liability, but rather on affirmative acts intentionally aimed at the forum. 
Landry v. Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants, 715 F. Supp. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989), illustrates this point well. The court held that plaintiffs met their burden by 
showing that a Canadian corporate director sued under a federal control person theory 
was a "behind the scenes player" in both the management of the company, and a critical 
corporate transaction that impacted the company's shares on NASDAQ. Id. at 102. 
Personal jurisdiction was premised on these affirmative acts which were aimed at the 
United States and caused foreseeable effects there. 
The other cases Plaintiffs cite fall under this same rule. In Derensis Coopers & 
Lybrand Chartered Accountants, 930 F. Supp. 1003 (D.N.J. 1996), the court held that it 
could exercise personal jurisdiction because plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that 
the foreign defendants "approved and disseminated financial statements that they knew 
would influence the price of [the company's] securities on the NASDAQ market." Id. at 
1014. In other words, the court's holding was premised on affirmative acts purposefully 
directed at the United States. 
Plaintiffs cite McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd., 46 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Tex. 
1999), which found personal jurisdiction over the officers and directors of yet another 
Canadian company. In McNamara, the court found that plaintiffs made a prima facie 
case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction using extensive affidavits and documentary 
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evidence. Id. at 638-41. This showing indicated that each foreign officer or director had 
minimum contacts with the United States and engaged in affirmative acts of purposeful 
availment with foreseeable consequences in the United States: each helped secure the 
company's NASDAQ listing, approved and/or signed the company's SEC filings, 
reviewed and/or wrote the allegedly false press releases, and promoted the company's 
stock to U.S. investors and analysts. Id. at 641. 
San Mateo County Transit District v. Dearman, 979 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992), 
comes from this same genre. The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction a 
case against the principal of a brokerage firm because plaintiffs failed to show the level 
of control required for liability under Section 20(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 
("Securities Act"). The Ninth Circuit expressed concern with the district judge's 
approach, whereby the plaintiffs' failure to establish liability on a motion to dismiss led 
the court to find no jurisdiction. Id. at 1358. The court stated that the standard of control 
person liability was lower than the district court thought, and "[e]ven lower is the 
standard for personal jurisdiction, which exists if the plaintiff makes a non-frivolous 
allegation that the defendant controlled a person liable for the fraud." Id. Taken out of 
context, this one sentence appears to put the San Mateo at odds with the U.S. Supreme 
Court's requirement of minimum contacts under International Shoe, and the requirement 
that each individual director's jurisdictional contacts must be assessed separately from 
the corporation under Calder. 
But, just past the surface, the San Mateo decision does not retain an 
unconstitutional hue. The district judge improperly imposed on plaintiffs an initial 
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evidentiary burden to prove that defendant was a control person in order to survive a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit rejected this 
formulation through reference to the self-executing service of process language of the 
Securities Act: "If the suit is to enforce a liability created by the Securities Act, the court 
has jurisdiction of the defendant wherever he may be found." Id. (construing 15 U.S.C. § 
78aa). This language does not represent a broad departure from the basic tenets of 
Fourteenth Amendment due process; rather, it is merely the method of obtaining personal 
jurisdiction in federal question cases, such as those under the federal securities laws. 
Plaintiffs may file suit in any federal district, provided that the defendant has 
constitutionally-required minimum contacts with the United States. DaimlerChrysler, 
197 F. Supp. 2d at 93 n.4 ("Because jurisdiction in this case is based on a statute that 
provides for nationwide service of process, the relevant minimum contacts inquiry 
focuses on the defendant's contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a 
particular state."); SEC v. The Infinity Group Co., 27 F. Supp. 2d 559, 563 (E.D. Pa. 
1998) (same). 
Though the Ninth Circuit was required to clarify the plaintiffs' pleading standard 
for liability, it did not address (as the issue was apparently not presented for appeal), 
whether indeed the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to permit 
personal jurisdiction. It appears that corporate bonds that were the focus of the alleged 
fraud were regulated in the U.S. by the National Association of Securities Dealers 
("NASD"), and that there was some evidence that the individual defendant may have 
been affirmatively involved in dealing with the NASD and others regarding the bond 
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offering. San Mateo, 979 F.2d at 1357. The defendants apparently had jurisdictional 
contacts with the United States. In contrast to Plaintiffs' strained interpretation of San 
Mateo, the Ninlh Circuit directly rejected Plaintiffs' theory in Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 
1357 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit found personal jurisdiction over a partnership, 
but rejected an argument that this would confer jurisdiction over the individual partners 
because they were jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the partnership: 
Liability and jurisdiction are independent. Liability depends on the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendants and between the 
individual defendants; jurisdiction depends only upon each defendant's 
relationship with the forum. Regardless of their joint liability, jurisdiction 
over each defendant must be established individually. 
Id. at 1365. 
As recent federal decisions reveal, the mere allegations of control person liability 
are no substitute for the minimum contacts required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In DaimlerChrysler, the court expressly rejected the theory that allegations of 
"control person" liability provide indicia of minimum contacts sufficient to create 
personal jurisdiction over an executive of a foreign corporation. The court held that such 
an approach "improperly merges" the question of liability with the "independent 
threshold consideration" of personal jurisdiction; the court "decline[d] to sidestep the 
time-honored and well-established due process analysis required for the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction." 197 F. Supp. 2d at 99. 
DaimlerChrysler follows and relies upon the holding in In re Baan Co. Securities 
Litigation, 81 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 2000), approved, 245 F. Supp. 2d 117 (D.D.C. 
2003). Baan also rejected the argument that allegations of federal control person liability 
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are sufficient to satisfy the plaintiffs' burden of proving minimum contacts, and 
specifically distinguishes McNamara, Derensis, Landry and San Mateo: 
The staggering implications of the acceptance of that theory makes it 
understandable that the cases, including the ones upon which plaintiffs try 
to rely, have never gone that far. To the contrary, each (with one 
exception) have required more than the allegation that defendant controlled 
the entity which performed the act claimed to have violated the pertinent 
securities law before asserting jurisdiction over its person. 
Id. at 80. 
Baan cautioned against reading too much into one sentence in the Ninth Circuit's 
San Mateo decision, for that would be "utterly inconsistent with the persistent insistence 
of the Supreme Court since the decision in [Hanson v. Denckla], that personal 
jurisdiction be premised on a showing that the defendant has, by his acts, purposefully 
availed himself of the forum's benefits."10 Id. at 81-82 (citation omitted). 
These concerns are appropriately taken to heart. Constitutional due process 
requires that it be "foreseeable" that any out-of-state activity would subject a nonresident 
to personal jurisdiction in the Utah courts. Foreseeability, in this context, does not mean 
a kind of general foreseeability that by serving as a director one might get sued in any 
state with securities statutes. Rather, it must be foreseeable that the "defendant's conduct 
and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being 
haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, AAA U.S. 286, 287 
10
 Indeed, the California Court of Appeal, in affirming the trial court's refusal to 
establish jurisdiction over these same Defendants, held that Plaintiffs' interpretation of 
San Mateo would give it an unconstitutional effect. Eaton Vance, 2003 WL 1521896, at 
*7 
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(1980). 
Plaintiffs argue that Utah, and forty-one other states, have control person statutes. 
BOA at 34 & n.12. But this means, under Plaintiffs' jurisdictional theory, that by joining 
the board of a company that makes routine SEC filings, the outside directors may be 
haled into court in any of these forty-two states merely on the basis of the allegation of 
control person liability. The potentially unlimited scope of personal jurisdiction under 
such a theory is why the United States Supreme Court has rejected minimum contacts 
based on the foreseeability of effects in a forum state and held that "it is essential in each 
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities in the forum State."11 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-75. 
Plaintiffs also argue that while "there is so little caselaw" addressing scenarios in 
which a corporation's directors move to dismiss a complaint sounding in state securities 
laws, "[m]uch more precedent" exists for construing liability under such laws. BOA at 
46-47. This argument is spurious. There have been thousands upon thousands of cases 
construing and considering the scope of liability under different statutes. We cannot 
1
 Adherence to the traditional test for minimum contacts does not allow directors to 
escape potential responsibility for their alleged actions. They can be sued in federal 
court, in their home states, or in other states where minimum contacts exist (as for 
example the domicile of the corporation on whose board they serve). 
i ^ 
Plaintiffs point to a handful of cases in which state courts have considered liability on 
the merits against officers or directors of a corporation. None of these cases address 
personal jurisdiction. See generally Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995); 
Sherman v. Lloyd, 181 Cal. App. 3d 693 (1986); Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d 
705 (1977); Eastwood v. Froelich, 60 Cal. App. 3d 523 (1976); The Neptune Society 
Corp. v. Longanecker, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1233 (1987). 
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assume that any time a court reaches the merits in an action, it must have leap-frogged 
federal due process. 
3. Even When Fully Applicable, The Control Person Statute 
Does Not Work A Substantive Change In The Principles 
Used To Define The Jurisdiction Of Utah Courts And 
Plaintiffs Have Failed To Bring Themselves Within The 
Requirements Of 61-1-22(4) 
Jurisdictional analysis has two components: does a statute authorize jurisdiction; 
and would the exercise of that statutory jurisdiction comport with constitutional 
requirements. D.A. v. State, 63 P.3d at 612; accord Sher, 911 F.2d at 1360. 
There is nothing in the language or history of § 61-1-22(4) suggesting that the 
Legislature meant for that statute to define the jurisdiction of Utah courts. Statutes that 
confer jurisdiction, such as § 78-27-24 (long-arm statute) or § 78-3a-l 10(13) (juvenile 
court jurisdiction) do so explicitly. 
Nothing in Utah law suggests that a statute creating a cause of action or allocating 
burdens of proof thereby confers jurisdiction on Utah courts. Plaintiffs are again mixing 
liability apples and jurisdictional oranges. See supra Section IV.E.2. There are causes of 
action where the plaintiffs burden of proof is relatively slight, and few defenses are 
available. But in such situations (strict liability comes to mind) courts still adhere to 
minimum contacts analysis with the burden of proof on plaintiffs. See generally Asahi 
Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
There is no support for the broad "presumption" Plaintiffs would have the Court 
draw from § 61-1-22(4). The case of Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995), 
recognizes an allocation to the defendant of the burden of proof as to the state of mind of 
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the control person. Id. at 876-77. That directors or officers may bear the burden, at trial, 
of establishing their state of mind in connection with the allegedly wrongful acts, does 
not equate with a presumption that these directors or officers have engaged in tortious 
acts aimed at Utah for jurisdictional purposes. At a loss for any authority that the Utah 
securities laws create such a presumption, Plaintiffs point to three cases interpreting 
California franchise law. Like Steenblik, these cases hold that defendants have the 
burden of establishing an innocent state of mind at trial.13 While Plaintiffs delve into 
California franchise law, they avoid the one California decision interpreting the control 
person provisions of the California securities laws, which holds that allegations of control 
person liability do not confer jurisdiction. Taylor-Rush, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 113-14. 
Plaintiffs also cite to dated authority from Illinois and Georgia to support their 
theory. These cases leave the question of jurisdiction untouched, and employ now-
obsolete interpretations of the control person provisions of their respective states. More 
recent cases show that Illinois and Georgia courts take an even more restrictive view of 
liability than this Court did in the Steenblik opinion; in these jurisdictions plaintiffs must 
prove knowledge or culpability for control person liability to attach. Compare Goelitz v. 
Lathrop, 3 N.E.2d 305, 315 (111. App. Ct. 1936) with Gowdy v. Richter, 314 N.E.2d 549, 
561 (111. App. 3d 1974) (director was not subject to control person liability because 
plaintiff failed to meet burden of showing that director had "knowledge" of the alleged 
violation); compare Boddy v. Theiling, 199 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ga. App. 1973) with Binder 
13
 See generally Neptune Society, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 1248; Courtney v. Waring, 191 
Cal. App. 3d 1434 (1987); Eastwood, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 523. 
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v. Gordian Sec, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 663, 667-68 (N.D. Ga. 1990) ("[M]ere status as an 
officer of [the corporation] does not make [defendant] a 'controlling person.'"). 
4. The Requirement Of Proof Of Minimum Contacts, Even 
In A Case Subject To § 61-1-22(4), Is A Proper 
Interpretation Of Utah Law, Consonant With The 
Requirements Of State And Federal Due Process 
Even if § 61-1-22(4) permitted personal jurisdiction in Utah over nonresidents, the 
exercise of that jurisdiction would still be limited by due process. Upon a fact-based 
inquiry, the trial court found a lack of the minimum contacts, as required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Utah cannot by statute assert jurisdiction beyond the limits set 
by minimum contacts and due process: 
[A]ny legislative enactment of personal jurisdiction, in or out of the long-
arm statute, cannot justify on its own the assertion of jurisdiction. The true 
safeguard on the extension of personal jurisdiction is the constitutional due 
process analysis, with its focus on minimum contacts and on traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, this test recognizes 
the legislature's authority to provide for the extension of personal 
jurisdiction as limited by established constitutional due process 
requirements. 
DA. v. State, 63 P.3d at 612. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Utah securities statutes empowered Utah courts to 
automatically exercise personal jurisdiction against any individual based solely on 
allegations that he is a "control person," such statutory authority would be trumped by the 
federal due process requirement that an individual have "minimum contacts" with Utah. 
Id.; accord Taylor-Rush, 217 Cal. App. 3d at 113-14. 
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F. Section 61-1-26 Governs Service Of Process And Is Not An 
Independent Basis For the Exercise Of Personal Jurisdiction 
Section 61-1-26 provides one of several means to serve process.14 It does not, as 
Plaintiffs claim, confer "jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in a manner consistent 
with federal constitutional due process concerns." BOA at 36. 
Plaintiffs rest their argument on these words in § 61-1-26(8): "and personal 
jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in this state . . . [substitute service 
shall have] . . . the same force and validity as if served on him personally." BOA at 37. 
However, this court held in D.A. v. State that although the near-identical language of § 
78-3a-l 10(13) provided a basis for personal jurisdiction under Utah law, the requirements 
of federal due process were a separate and indispensable inquiry. 63 P.3d at 612-13. 
Substitution of service statutes, like § 61-1-26 and § 78-3a-l 10(13), serve as alternatives 
to the Utah long-arm statute and confer jurisdiction under state law {Piantes v. Hay den-
Stone, Inc., 514 P.2d 529, 530 (Utah 1970)), but do not obviate the requirements of 
federal due process. See D.A. v. State, 63 P.3d at 612-13. 
Courts in other states have recognized the differences between state securities 
statutes governing service of process and the minimum contacts necessary for personal 
jurisdiction. Bank of Am. Nat'I Trust and Sav. Assoc, v. GAC Properties Credit, 389 
14
 "When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in conduct 
prohibited or made actionable by this chapter or any rule or other hereunder, and he has 
not filed a consent to service of process . . . and personal jurisdiction over him cannot 
otherwise be obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his 
appointment of the division or director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful 
process in any noncriminal suit. . . which grows out of that conduct and which is brought 
under this chapter or any rule or other hereunder, with the same force and validity as if 
served on him personally." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8). 
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A.2d 1304, 1309-10 (Del. Ch. 1978) (Delaware securities statute still required 
constitutionally-mandated minimum contacts for the exercise of personal jurisdiction); 
Paulos v. Best Sec., Inc., 109 N.W. 2d 576, 579-82 (Minn. 1961) (Minnesota securities 
statute was an adequate basis for substitute service of process, but minimum contacts are 
required for exercise of personal jurisdiction). Plaintiffs concede that the substitution of 
service sections under the securities laws of Delaware and Minnesota, are "nearly 
identical" to Utah, BOA 34 n. 13, so these cases are highly persuasive. 
Plaintiffs cite Brown v. Investment Management and Research, Inc., 475 S.E.2d 
754 (S.C. 1996), where the South Carolina Supreme Court held that an analogous 
substitution of service statute authorized personal jurisdiction under state law. However, 
the court left open the possibility that the exercise of jurisdiction over particular 
defendants might violate due process - an issue "more properly addressed by the trial 
court on remand." Id. at 757 n.6. 
American Microtel, Inc. v. Secretary of State, No. CA935874, 1995 WL 809575 
(Mass. Super. Jan. 27, 1995), also relied upon by the Plaintiffs, is distinguishable because 
it considers the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the Massachusetts Securities Division 
in an administrative proceeding to regulate the conduct of an unregistered broker-dealer. 
When the personal jurisdiction of a court is obtained through the very same substitute of 
service statute, the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction must "also comport with the 
requirements of Due Process." Harbourvest Int 7 Private Equity Partners II-Direct Fund, 
L.P. v. Axent Techs., Inc., No. 99-2188, 2000 WL 1466096, at *7 n.12 (Mass. Super. 
Aug. 21, 2000). 
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Plaintiffs' argument is also undermined by case law construing section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which permits service of process "wherever the 
defendant may be found." 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. Despite this broadly worded statute, 
plaintiffs must still prove that a defendant has minimum contacts with the United States 
before personal jurisdiction is established. Securities Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 
F.2d 1309, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that for personal jurisdiction through service 
effected under section 27, the nonresident must still have constitutionally required 
minimum contacts with the United States); Baan, 81 F. Supp. 2d at 77 ("It does not 
follow, however, that merely because service has been effected in accordance with 
American rules of procedure, that alien defendants can be thereby made subject ipso facto 
to the jurisdiction of any American court. Instead, aliens may claim the Fifth 
Amendment protection from being haled into an American court in a manner which 
contradicts traditional (and American) notions of fair play and justice."). 
G. The Exercise Of Personal Jurisdiction Over The Outside 
Director Defendants Would Not Comport With "Fair Play And 
Substantial Justice" 
Even if the other elements of specific jurisdiction had been met in this case (and 
they were not), the exercise of jurisdiction over the outside directors would be 
unreasonable and would not comport with "fair play and substantial justice." Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 476. During the relevant period, the record shows that the outside 
directors were not executives and they were not involved in the day-to-day management 
of Safety-Kleen. See Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
("[Ojrdinarily, outside directors are not involved in a corporation's day-to-day affairs."). 
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Plaintiffs have not alleged specific facts, or produced any evidence, establishing 
that any of the outside directors affirmatively directed any act at Utah or participated in 
creating any false financial statement or report. It is unreasonable to subject any outside 
director to jurisdiction based on the singular fact of board membership. 
It is particularly unreasonable to subject outside directors Thomas and Wareham 
to jurisdiction because they joined the board in June 1997. RA 0165-67, 0171-73. The 
vast majority of the financial statements incorporated in the Preliminary Offering 
Memorandum that Plaintiffs allegedly relied upon in making their purchases predate June 
1997. RA 011-12. Only one document, LES's Form 8-K dated June 11, 1997, even 
appears to be within the allegedly "relevant" time frame when these two outside directors 
served on the board. Id. There is no coherent allegation that the outside directors 
Wareham and Thomas assisted in manipulating the data on a Form 8-K. 
Utah also lacks an interest in adjudicating this case. Neither Plaintiffs nor the 
Defendants are Utah residents. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 114 ("Because the plaintiff is not a 
California resident, California's legitimate interests in the dispute have considerably 
diminished."). The equities similarly weigh against Plaintiffs because they are not only 
non-residents, but "sophisticated business entities]" who can litigate in an appropriate 
forum where the Defendants have the requisite jurisdictional contact, as readily as in 
Utah. Roskelley, 610 P.2d at 1313 (holding that plaintiffs' relative sophistication 
weighed against the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The order on the motions to dismiss should be affirmed. 
VII. ADDENDUM 
An Addendum is attached as pages A-1 to A-20, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Dated: June 24, 2003 
MEREDITH N. LANDY (admitted pro hac vice) 
DHAIVAT H. SHAH (admitted pro hac vice) 
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and, 
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ADDENDUM 
UTST§ 61-1-1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 61-1-1 
Page 1 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-1 Fraud unlawful. 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of 
any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-1, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 4. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Repeals and Reenactments. --Sections 61-1-1 to 61-1-41 (L. 1925, ch. 87, § § 1 
to 10, lOx, 11 to 18, 20 to 27; 1927, ch. 59, § 1; 1929, ch. 79, § 1; R. S. 1933, 
82-1-1 to 82-1-41; L. 1941 (1st S. S.), ch. 29, § § 1, 2; C. 1943, 82-1-1 to 82-1-
41; L. 1957, ch. 129, § 1; 1961, ch. 149, § 1), relating to the state securities 
commission, were repealed by Laws 1963, ch. 145, § 1 (see § 61-1- 30). Present § 
§ 61-1-1 to 61-1-30 were enacted by § 1 of the act. 
Comparable Provisions.--Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1801 et seq. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Title 11, Art. 51. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-22 Sales and purchases in violation --Remedies --Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-
3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under Section 61-1-
15, which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is used, 
any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 61- 1-11(7), or offers, sells, 
or purchases a security in violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) is liable to the 
person selling the security to or buying the security from him, who may sue either 
at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the security, together 
with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the 
tender of the security or for damages if he no longer owns the security. 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender less the 
value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at 12% per year 
from the date of disposition. 
(2) The court in a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount equal to 
three times the consideration paid for the security, together with interest, costs, 
and attorney's fees, less any amounts, all as specified in Subsection (1) upon a 
showing that the violation was reckless or intentional. 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 61-1- 1(2) 
is not liable under Subsection (1) (a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or 
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission. 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller or 
buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, 
every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially aids in the sale or 
purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller or 
purchaser, unless the nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not 
have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is 
alleged to exist. 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UTST§ 61-1-22 
U.CA. 1953 § 61-1-22 
Page 2 
liable. 
(5) Any tender specified in this section may be made at any time before entry of 
judgment. 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of any person who 
might have been a plaintiff or defendant. 
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this section 
unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or transaction 
constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after the discovery by 
the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, whichever expires first. 
(b) No person may sue under this section if: 
(i) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a time 
when he owned the security, to refund the consideration paid together with interest 
at 12% per year from the date of payment, less the amount of any income received 
on the security, and he failed to accept the offer within 3 0 days of its receipt; 
or 
(ii) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a time 
when he did not own the security, unless he rejected the offer in writing within 3 0 
days of its receipt. 
(8) No person who has made or engaged in the performance of any contract in 
violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired any 
purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the facts by reason of 
which its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit on the 
contract. 
(9) A condition, stipulation, or provision binding a person acquiring a security 
to waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order hereunder is void. 
(10) (a) The rights and remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any 
other rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity. 
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this 
section or Subsection 61-1-4 (6) . 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-22, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1979, ch. 218, § 7; 
1983, ch. 284, § 32; 1986, ch. 107, § 2; 1990, ch. 133, § 15; 1991, ch. 161, § 
14; 1998, ch. 13, § 62. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 61. SECURITIES DIVISION --REAL ESTATE DIVISION 
CHAPTER 1. UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
61-1-26 Scope of the act --Service of process, 
(1) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), Sections 61-1-7, 61-1-15.5, 61-1- 17, 
and 61-1-22 apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when: 
(a) an offer to sell is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state. 
(2) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), and Section 61-1-17 apply to persons 
who buy or offer to buy when: 
(a) an offer to buy is made in this state; or 
(b) an offer to sell is made and accepted in this state. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this 
state whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer: 
(a) originates from this state; or 
(b) is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to which 
it is directed, or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed offer. 
(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is accepted in 
this state when acceptance: 
(a) is communicated to the offeror in this state; and 
(b) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or in writing, 
outside this state, and acceptance is communicated to the offeror in this state, 
whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offeree directs 
it to the offeror in this state reasonably believing the offeror to be in this 
state and it is received at the place to which it is directed or at any post office 
in this state in the case of a mailed acceptance. 
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made in this state when: 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this state 
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any bona fide newspaper or other publication of general, regular, and paid 
circulation which is not published in this state, or which is published in this 
state but has had more than 2/3 of its circulation outside this state during the 
past 12 months; or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside this state is received in 
this state. 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as Section 61-1-17 so far as 
investment advisers are concerned, apply when any act instrumental in effecting 
prohibited conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party is then 
present in this state. 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chapter and every issuer 
which proposes to offer a security in this state through any person acting on an 
agency basis in the common-law sense shall file with the division, in such form as 
it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent appointing the division or the 
director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor, executor, or 
administrator which arises under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder after 
the consent has been filed, with the same force and validity as if served 
personally on the person filing the consent. 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent in connection with a previous 
registration or notice filing need not file another. 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the 
division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division in 
a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and a 
copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his last 
address on file with the division, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with 
this subsection is filed in the case on or before the return day of the process, if 
any, or within such further time as the court allows. 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in 
conduct prohibited or made actionable by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of process under Subsection 
(7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained in this state, 
that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his appointment of the division or 
the director to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his successor executor or 
administrator which grows out of that conduct and which is brought under this 
chapter or any rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if 
served on him personally. 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the 
division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the division 
in a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the service and 
a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or respondent at his 
last-known address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give 
actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of compliance with this subsection is 
filed in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within 
such further time as the court allows. 
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(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or the director shall 
order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant or respondent 
reasonable opportunity to defend. 
History: C. 1953, 61-1-26, enacted by L. 1963, ch. 145, § 1; 1983, ch. 284, § 36; 
1990, ch. 133, § 17; 1992, ch. 216, § 6; 1997, ch. 160, § 11. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, inserted "61-1-
15.5" in the series of sections in Subsection (1) and inserted "or notice filing" 
in Subsection (7)(b). 
Cross-References. --Corporations doing business in state to have resident agent, 
§ 16-10a-1508. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Foreign contracts. 
In personam jurisdiction. 
Pleadings. 
Foreign contracts. 
Act did not apply to contracts made and entered into in another state. United 
States Bond & Fin. Corp. v. National Bldg. & Loan Ass'n of Am., 80 Utah 62, 12 P.2d 
758, rehearing denied, 80 Utah 70, 17 P.2d 238 (1932) (decided under former law). 
In personam jurisdiction. 
Subsection (8) does not provide the exclusive method of acquiring jurisdiction 
over one in violation of the Securities Act, but simply gives a special means of 
doing so; it does not prevent the obtaining of personal jurisdiction by any other 
means provided by statute and, in particular, does not preclude the use of § 78-
27-22, the "long-arm statute." Piantes v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 
P.2d 529 (1973), cert, denied, 415 U.S. 995, 94 S. Ct. 1599, 39 L. Ed. 2d 893, 
rehearing denied, 416 U.S. 963, 94 S. Ct. 1983, 40 L. Ed. 2d 314 (1974). 
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UTAH CODE, 19 53 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART III. Procedure 
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright @ 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-27-22 Jurisdiction over nonresidents --Purpose of provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public 
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of redress 
against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with 
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection. This 
legislative action is deemed necessary because of technological progress which has 
substantially increased the flow of commerce between the several states resulting 
in increased interaction between persons of this state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants 
to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 246, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Meaning of 'this act'. --The term "this act," in the second paragraph, means Laws 
1969, ch. 246, which enacted § § 78-27-22 to 78-27-28. 
Cross-References. --Foreign corporations, registered office and agent, § 16-
10a-1508. 
Foreign fraternals, service of process upon commissioner, § 31A-14-203. 
Nonresident motorists, long-arm provision, § 41-12a-403. 
Service of process, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. Courts 
CHAPTER 3a. JUVENILE COURTS 
PART 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
78-3a-110 Summons --Service and process --Issuance and contents --Notice to absent 
parent or guardian --Emergency medical or surgical treatment -- Compulsory process 
for attendance of witnesses when authorized. 
(1) After a petition is filed the court shall promptly issue a summons, unless 
the judge directs that a further investigation is needed. No summons is required as 
to any person who appears voluntarily or who files a written waiver of service with 
the clerk of the court at or prior to the hearing. 
(2) The summons shall contain: 
(a) the name of the court; 
(b) the title of the proceedings; and 
(c) except for a published summons, a brief statement of the substance of the 
allegations in the petition. 
(3) A published summons shall state: 
(a) that a proceeding concerning the minor is pending in the court; and 
(b) an adjudication will be made. 
(4) The summons shall require the person or persons who have physical custody of 
the minor to appear personally and bring the minor before the court at a time and 
place stated. If the person or persons summoned are not the parent, parents, or 
guardian of the minor, the summons shall also be issued to the parent, parents, or 
guardian, as the case may be, notifying them of the pendency of the case and of the 
time and place set for the hearing. 
(5) Summons may be issued requiring the appearance of any other person whose 
presence the court finds necessary. 
(6) If it appears to the court that the welfare of the minor or of the public 
requires that the minor be taken into custody, the court may by endorsement upon 
the summons direct that the person serving the summons take the minor into custody 
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at once. 
(7) Upon the sworn testimony of one or more reputable physicians, the court may 
order emergency medical or surgical treatment that is immediately necessary for a 
minor concerning whom a petition has been filed pending the service of summons upon 
his parents, guardian, or custodian. 
(8) A parent or guardian is entitled to the issuance of compulsory process for 
the attendance of witnesses on his own behalf or on behalf of the minor. A guardian 
ad litem or a probation officer is entitled to compulsory process for the 
attendance of witnesses on behalf of the minor. 
(9) Service of summons and process and proof of service shall be made in the 
manner provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(10) Service of summons or process shall be made by the sheriff of the county 
where the service is to be made, or by his deputy; but upon request of the court 
service shall be made by any other peace officer, or by another suitable person 
selected by the court. 
(11) Service of summons in the state shall be made personally, by delivering a 
copy to the person summoned; provided, however, that parents of a minor living 
together at their usual place of abode may both be served by personal delivery to 
either parent of copies of the summons, one copy for each parent. 
(12) If the judge makes a written finding that he has reason to believe that 
personal service of the summons will be unsuccessful, or will not accomplish 
notification within a reasonable time after issuance of the summons, he may order 
service by registered mail, with a return receipt to be signed by the addressee 
only, to be addressed to the last-known address of the person to be served in the 
state. Service shall be complete upon return to the court of the signed receipt. 
(13) If the parents, parent, or guardian required to be summoned under Subsection 
(4) cannot be found within the state, the fact of their minor's presence within the 
state shall confer jurisdiction on the court in proceedings in minor's cases under 
this chapter as to any absent parent or guardian, provided that due notice has been 
given in the following manner: 
(a) If the address of the parent or guardian is known, due notice is given by 
sending him a copy of the summons by registered mail with a return receipt to be 
signed by the addressee only, or by personal service outside the state, as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Service by registered mail shall be complete 
upon return to the court of the signed receipt. 
(b) If the address or whereabouts of the parent or guardian outside the state 
cannot after diligent inquiry be ascertained, due notice is given by publishing a 
summons in a newspaper having general circulation in the county in which the 
proceeding is pending. The summons shall be published once a week for four 
successive weeks. Service shall be complete on the day of the last publication. 
(c) Service of summons as provided in this subsection shall vest the court with 
jurisdiction over the parent or guardian served in the same manner and to the same 
extent as if the person served was served personally within the state. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UTST§ 78-3a-110 
U.CA. 1953 § 78-3a-110 
Page 3 
(14) In the case of service in the state, service completed not less than 48 
hours before the time set in the summons for the appearance of the person served, 
shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. In the case of service outside the 
state, service completed not less than five days before the time set in the summons 
for appearance of the person served, shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 
(15) Computation of periods of time under this chapter shall be made in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 78-3a-110, enacted by L. 1997, ch. 365, § 24. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Effective Dates. --Laws 1997, ch. 365 became effective on March 21, 1997, 
pursuant to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. --Process, U.R.C.P. 4. 
Time, U.R.C.P. 6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Child's marital status. 
Because the juvenile court had jurisdiction over a 16-year-old married minor and 
the jurisdiction over her parents was not dependent on the child's majority status 
under § 15-2-1, the court had broad authority to summon the parents to court. T.G. 
v. State, 1999 UT App 268, 987 P.2d 1272. 
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WESTS ANNOTATED CALIFORNIA CODES 
CORPORATIONS CODE 
TITLE 4. SECURITIES 
DIVISION 1. CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968 
PART 6. ENFORCEMENT 
CHAPTER L CIVIL LIABILITY 
Copr. €> West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current through Ch. 14 of 2003-04 Reg.Sess. urgency legislation, 
Ch. 12 of 1st Ex.Sess. urgency legislation, & Ch. 1 of 2nd Ex.Sess. 
§ 25504. Joint and several liability of other persons, partners, etc., with persons liable under section 25501 or 25503 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a person liable under Section 25501 or 25503, every partner in a 
firm so liable, every principal executive officer or director of a corporation so liable, every person occupying a 
similar status or performing similar functions, every employee of a person so liable who materially aids in the act or 
transaction constituting the violation, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially aids in the act or transaction 
constituting the violation, are also liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such person, unless the 
other person who is so liable had no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by 
reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
CREDIT(S) 
1977 Main Volume 
(Added by Stats.1968, c. 88, p. 281, § 2, operative Jan. 2, 1969.) 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
1977 Main Volume 
Former § 25504, which related to contents of application required of corporate applicant, added by Stats. 1949, c. 
384, p. 708, § 1, was repealed by Stats.1968, c. 88, p. 243, § 1, operative Jan. 2, 1969 and was derived from 
Stats.l917,c. 532, p. 675, § 3; Stats. 1931, c. 423, p. 941, § 2; Stats. 1941, c. 615, p. 2064, § 1. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Collateral participant liability under state securities laws. Douglas M. Branson, 19 Pepp.L.Rev. 1027 (1992). 
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CORPORATIONS CODE 
TITLE 4. SECURITIES 
DIVISION 1. CORPORATE SECURITIES LAW OF 1968 
PART 6. ENFORCEMENT 
CHAPTER 4. SERVICE OF PROCESS 
Copr. © West Group 2003. All rights reserved. 
Current through Ch. 14 of 2003-04 Reg.Sess. urgency legislation, 
Ch. 12 of 1st Ex.Sess. urgency legislation, & Ch. 1 of 2nd Ex.Sess. 
§ 25550. Appointment of commissioner to receive service of process; service upon commissioner; forwarding 
notice and copy of process; affidavit of compliance 
When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable by this 
law or any rule or order hereunder, whether or not he has filed a consent to service of process under subdivision (h) 
of Section 25102, Section 25165 or Section 25240, and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained 
in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his appointment of the commissioner or his successor in 
office to be his attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor, executor, or administrator which grows out of that conduct and which is brought under 
this law or any rule or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on him personally. Service may 
be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of the commissioner, but it is not effective unless (a) the 
plaintiff, who may be the commissioner in a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by him, forthwith sends notice of 
the service and a copy of the process by registered or certified mail to the defendant or respondent at his last known 
address or takes other steps which are reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and (b) the plaintiffs affidavit of 
compliance with this section is filed in the case on or before the return day of the process, if any, or within such 
further time as the court allows. 
CREDIT(S) 
1977 Main Volume 
(Added by Stats.1968, c. 88, p. 285, § 2, operative Jan. 2, 1969. Amended by Stats.1973, c. 390, p. 850, § 20.) 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
1977 Main Volume 
The 1973 amendment inserted, in the first sentence, the words "subdivision (h) of Section 25102". 
Prior law: Former § 25900, added by Stats.1949, c. 384, p. 717, § 1. 
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 15. COMMERCE AND TRADE 
CHAPTER 2B--SECURITIES EXCHANGES 
Copr. © West Group 2003. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 108-32, approved 06-17-03 
§ 78aa. Jurisdiction of offenses and suits 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter or the rules and 
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by 
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. Any criminal proceeding may be brought in the district wherein 
any act or transaction constituting the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created 
by this chapter or rules and regulations thereunder, or to enjoin any violation of such chapter or rules and 
regulations, may be brought in any such district or in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant 
or transacts business, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defendant is an 
inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered shall be subject to review 
as provided in sections 1254, 1291, 1292, and 1294 of Title 28. No costs shall be assessed for or against the 
Commission in any proceeding under this chapter brought by or against it in the Supreme Court or such other courts. 
CREDIT(S) 
(June 6, 1934, c. 404, Title I, § 27, 48 Stat. 902; June 25, 1936, c. 804, 49 Stat. 1921; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 
32(b), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Dec. 4, 1987, Pub.L. 100-181, Title III, § 326, 101 
Stat. 1259.) 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1949 Acts. Senate Report No. 303 and House Report No. 352, see 1949 U.S. Code Cong. Service, p. 1248. 
1987 Acts. Senate Report No. 100-105, see 1987 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 2089. 
References in Text 
This chapter, referred to in text, in the original read "this title". See References in Text note set out under § 78a 
of this title. 
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Codifications 
As originally enacted section contained references to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. Act June 25, 
1936, substituted "the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia" for "the Supreme Court of the 
District of Columbia", and Act June 25, 1948, as amended by Act May 24, 1949, substituted "United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia" for "district court of the United States for the District of Columbia". Pub.L. 100-
181 struck out reference to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Previously, such words had 
been editorially eliminated as superfluous in view of section 132(a) of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, 
which provides that "There shall be in each judicial district a district court which shall be a court of record known as 
the United States District Court for the district", and section 88 of Title 28 which provides that "the District of 
Columbia constitutes one judicial district". 
[For delegation of functions of the President under section 5003(d)(1) of Pub.L. 100-418 to the Secretary of State, 
see section 3-101 ofEx.Ord.No. 12661, Dec. 27, 1988, 54 F.R. 779, set out as a note under section 2901 of Title 19, 
Customs Duties.] 
Amendments 
1987 Amendments. Pub.L. 100-181, § 326(1), (2), struck from the first sentence ", the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia," following "district courts of the United States"; and substituted in the fourth 
sentence "sections 1254, 1291, 1292, and 1294 of Title 28" for "sections 128 and 240 of the Judicial Code, as 
amended (U.S.C., title 28, sees. 225 and 347)". 
Transfer of Functions 
For transfer of the functions of the Securities and Exchange Commission, with certain exceptions, to the chairman 
of such commission, see Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950, § § 1, 2, eff. May 24, 1950, 15 F.R. 3175, 64 Stat. 1265, set 
out under section 78d of this title. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Costs, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 54, 28 USCA. 
Jurisdiction of offenses and suits under-
investment Advisers Act of 1940, see 15 USCA § 80b-14. 
Investment Company Act of 1940, see 15 USCA § 80a-43. 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, see 15 USCA § 79y. 
Securities Act of 1933, see 15 USCA § 77v. 
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, see 15 USCA § 77vvv. 
One form of action, see Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. Rule 2, 28 USCA. 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation's authority to file application for protective decree with any court of 
competent jurisdiction specified in this section upon determining member failed or in danger of failing to 
meet obligations to customers, see 15 USCA § 78eee. 
Special venue provisions of this section as unaffected by Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Notes of 
Advisory Committee under Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 18, 28 USCA. 
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Court of Appeal, Third District, California. 
EATON VANCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
John R, GRAINGER, et al., Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. C040158. 
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Richard M. Hermann, Lieff, Cabraser, Hermann & 
Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff and 
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DAVIS, J. 
*1 In this action arising from corporate accounting 
fraud, the plaintiffs appeal from an order that quashed 
service of summons on several nonresident corporate 
officers and directors. (Code Civ. Proc, § § 418.10, 
subd. (a)(1), 904.1, subd. (a)(3).) The trial court 
found it lacked personal jurisdiction over these 
individuals. We agree and affirm the order. 
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There are three issues: (1) do the officers and 
directors have sufficient "minimum contacts" with 
California to sustain personal jurisdiction; (2) does 
Corporations Code section 25504, which equates a 
corporation's liability for securities fraud with that of 
a person who controls the corporation, provide a 
basis for personal jurisdiction; and (3) does 
Corporations Code section 25550, which provides for 
substituted service of process on the Commissioner 
of Corporations, provide a basis for personal 
jurisdiction? We answer all three questions no. 
BACKGROUND 
In July 1997, Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. 
(LES) guaranteed a $19.5 million bond issuance. The 
bonds were issued by the California Pollution Control 
Financing Authority. The bond proceeds allowed 
LES to refinance the costs of two hazardous waste 
treatment facilities in California. At the time of the 
bond issuance, LES was a partially-owned subsidiary 
of Laidlaw, Inc. (Laidlaw), a Canadian corporation. 
In May 1998, LES became Safety-Kleen Corporation 
(Safety-Kleen); Safety-Kleen is a Delaware 
corporation headquartered in South Carolina, and it 
assumed LES's obligations under the guarantee 
arrangement for the bond issuance. 
In March 2000, Safety-Kleen announced that it had 
discovered "accounting irregularities" in the 
LES/Safety-Kleen financial statements filed for the 
1997-1999 fiscal years. The bonds became worthless 
following Safety-Kleen's announcement. In June 
2000, Safety-Kleen (and according to plaintiffs, 
Laidlaw too) filed for bankruptcy. A month later, 
Safety-Kleen announced that it had reduced its 
reported earnings for the 1997-1999 fiscal years by 
approximately $534 million, and had sustained a loss 
of about $833 million in the 2000 fiscal year. 
The plaintiffs are five East Coast-based institutional 
purchasers of the bonds: Eaton Vance Distributors, 
Inc.; T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.; Delaware 
Investment Advisors; Putnam Investments, Inc.; and 
John Hancock Funds, Inc. The plaintiffs purchased 
the bonds on behalf of several mutual funds designed 
to provide tax-free income to California investors and 
investment opportunities for residents of other states. 
Based on the "accounting irregularities" that 
rendered the bonds worthless, the plaintiffs sued 
Laidlaw as well as the officers and directors of LES 
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at the time of the bond issuance. The plaintiffs 
alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
violation of fraud-based California securities laws 
(Corp.Code, § § 25400, 25401, 25403, 25500, 
25501). 
Several of the sued officers and directors, none of 
whom live in California, moved successfully to quash 
service of summons based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction. These officers and directors are Michael 
Bragagnolo, Henry Taylor, James Bullock, John 
Grainger, Leslie Haworth, John Rollins, Sr. (now 
deceased), John Rollins, Jr., David Thomas, Henry 
Tippie, James Wareham, and Grover Wrenn. (The 
plaintiffs have not challenged the ruling on Wrenn's 
motion because he became an officer or director of 
LES shortly after the bond issuance.) 
*2 This appeal ensued from the order quashing 
service. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Basic Jurisdiction and Review Principles 
California's courts may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident individual on any basis consistent 
with the federal or state Constitutions. (Pavlovich v. 
Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal .4th 262, 268 
{Pavlovich ); Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, 
Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 {Vons ); Code Civ. 
Proc, § 410.10.) The due process clause provides the 
constitutional focus. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 
444; International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 
326 U.S. 310, 316, 320 [90 L.Ed. 951.) 
The due process clause sets forth two requirements 
to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction: (1) the 
nonresident defendant must have sufficient 
"minimum contacts" with California; and (2) the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must be 
"reasonable." (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 444, 
449; Burger King Corp. v.. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 
U.S. 462, 471-472, 475-477 f85 L.Ed.2d 5281.) 
In the minimum contacts analysis, courts have 
identified two types of personal jurisdiction: general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. (Pavlovich, 
supra, 29 CaL4th at pp. 268-269; Vons, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 445; Serafini v. Superior Court (1998) 
68 Cal.App.4th 70/78, 80 (Serafini); Tracinda Corp. 
v. DaimlerChrysler AG (D.Del.2002) 197 F.Supp.2d 
86, 93 (Tracinda ).) General jurisdiction may exist if 
the defendant's contacts with the forum state are 
substantial, continuous and systematic. (Vons, supra, 
14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) Where general jurisdiction 
cannot be shown, as is true here, a court may assume 
specific jurisdiction over a defendant in a particular 
case. (Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 
Cal.App.4th 894, 904 (Goehring ).) Specific 
jurisdiction exists when the defendant has 
purposefully directed his activities toward the forum 
state, and the litigation arises out of or relates to those 
activities. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 269; 
Taylor-Rush v. Multitech Corp. (1990) 217 
Cal.App.3d 103, 112 (Taylor-Rush ); Tracinda, 
supra, 197F.Supp.2datp. 93.) 
When a nonresident defendant moves to quash 
service of summons on jurisdictional grounds, the 
plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating that 
sufficient minimum contacts exist between the 
defendant and the forum state to justify the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 
449; Taylor-Rush, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 112.) 
If the plaintiff makes this showing, then the 
defendant must demonstrate that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable. (Vons, supra, 14 
Cal.4th at p. 449.) When there is conflicting 
evidence, the trial court's factual determinations are 
upheld if substantial evidence supports them. (Ibid.) 
If there is no conflicting evidence, the question of 
jurisdiction is one of law and the reviewing court 
engages in independent review. (Ibid.) 
2. Minimum Contacts 
*3 The principle of specific jurisdiction that applies 
here is that personal jurisdiction may be exercised 
over a defendant who has caused an effect in the 
forum state by an act or omission occurring 
elsewhere. (Taylor-Rush, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 112.) Under this principle, jurisdiction may be 
invoked only where the defendant committed the act 
or omission intending or expecting to cause effects in 
California. (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 269-
273; Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 909; 
Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 81.) 
In applying this principle to nonresident corporate 
officers and directors who allegedly have engaged in 
tortious or tortious-related corporate conduct, the 
following must be noted. The mere fact that 
California has jurisdiction over the nonresident 
corporation does not mean that the state has 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Slip Copy 
Not Officially Published 
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 976,977) 
Page 3 
(Cite as: 2003 WL 1521896 (CaLApp. 3 Dist.)) 
jurisdiction over the corporation's nonresident 
officers and directors. (Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 
U.S. 783, 790 \19 L.Ed.2d 8041 (Calder ); see 
Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.) The 
requirements of personal jurisdiction must be met as 
to each defendant over whom a state court exercises 
jurisdiction; thus, each defendant's contacts with the 
forum state must be assessed individually. (Calder, 
supra, 465 U.S. at p. 790.) To establish a basis for 
personal jurisdiction, the officer or director must 
have personally directed or actively participated in 
the tortious conduct, and that conduct must have been 
purposefully directed toward the forum state. 
(Seagate Technology v. A.J Kogyo Co. (1990) 219 
Cal.App.3d 696, 701-704 (Seagate ); Taylor-Rush, 
supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at pp. 112-114; Serafini, 
supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 80-81; see Pavlovich, 
supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 269-273.) Doing nothing 
more than simply ratifying an action taken by the 
corporation or by another corporate officer or director 
is not enough. (Seagate, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 
704.) 
The plaintiffs presented the following evidence to 
establish minimum contacts regarding the 
nonresident officers and directors who moved to 
quash service of summons. 
The plaintiffs submitted the offering memorandum 
for the bond issuance. The offering memorandum 
specified the LES corporate roles of the individual 
defendants at the time of the bond issuance. 
Bragagnolo was LES's chief operating officer, 
responsible for operations, sales and marketing. 
(Bragagnolo was placed on leave, and subsequently 
resigned, following the disclosure of the "accounting 
irregularities" by LES/Safety-Kleen.) Taylor was 
LES's general counsel and secretary, responsible for 
legal affairs, regulatory compliance and 
governmental relations. Bullock, Grainger and 
Haworth were LES directors, and held high executive 
positions with Laidlaw or related entities. Rollins, 
Sr., Rollins, Jr., Thomas, Tippie and Wareham were 
outside directors of LES. 
The plaintiffs also noted that the offering 
memorandum incorporated numerous corporate 
financial statements from the 1997 fiscal year that 
contained material misstatements resulting from the 
"accounting irregularities." These corporate financial 
statements, plaintiffs asserted, "were signed by, 
among others, [defendant Henry Taylor." 
*4 The plaintiffs further noted that the offering 
memorandum identified defendants Haworth, Tippie 
and Wareham as "Audit Committee Members." Such 
members oversaw LES's " 'financial reporting process 
and internal controls' " and considered " 'major 
changes and major questions of choice regarding 
appropriate auditing and accounting principles and 
practices to be followed when preparing corporate 
financial statements.'" 
Finally, the plaintiffs noted that, "[a]s the managing 
officers and directors ..., the ... defendants [moving to 
quash service] controlled, managed and operated 
LES, later Safety-Kleen, and in so doing, transacted 
business in ... California by virtue of, at a minimum, 
the operation of facilities in California, the directed 
offering of the Bonds to Plaintiffs, [and] the ... 
continuing obligation to disclose financial 
information prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles for the benefit of 
holders and beneficial holders of the Bonds." 
This evidence does not show which individual 
officers and directors personally directed or actively 
participated in the alleged tortious conduct, or 
whether they purposefully directed that conduct 
toward California. Plaintiffs state generally that the 
officers and directors collectively controlled, 
managed and operated LES and thereby directed the 
offering of the bonds to the plaintiffs. From this 
evidence, one can only speculate that individual 
officers and directors personally directed or actively 
participated in the tortious conduct; this does not 
suffice to establish specific personal jurisdiction. 
(Serafini, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 81 .) Merely 
identifying defendants Haworth, Tippie and 
Wareham as audit committee board members (and 
listing the general functions of that committee's 
members) suffers from a similar vagueness. 
The plaintiffs do get more specific regarding 
defendants Taylor and Bragagnolo. As LES's general 
counsel and secretary, Taylor signed some of the 
"irregular" corporate financial statements that the 
offering memorandum incorporated. Nevertheless, as 
part of the bond issuance, Taylor, in his general 
counsel and secretary capacity for LES, issued a 
required legal letter opinion that specifically 
excluded from its coverage any opinions or 
representations regarding the accuracy of the 
corporate financial statements incorporated in the 
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offering memorandum. As for Bragagnolo, he 
submitted a declaration stating that he neither signed 
nor prepared the offering memorandum or the 
incorporated financial statements. Bragagnolo also 
noted that he did not participate in the sale or 
marketing of the bonds, and did not make, authorize, 
or approve any representations made in connection 
with the sale of the bonds. 
The trial court properly found that the plaintiffs 
failed to show that individual officers and directors 
had sufficient minimum contacts with California for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction. 
3. Control Person Statute—Corporations Code 
Section 25504 
*5 At the hearing on the motions to quash (and 
continuing on appeal), the plaintiffs shifted their 
focus from a traditional minimum contacts analysis to 
an analysis based on Corporations Code section 
25504. (All further undesignated section references 
are to the Corporations Code.) It was at the hearing 
on the motions to quash that plaintiffs first cited 
section 25504. Section 25504 equates a corporation's 
liability for securities fraud with that of a person who 
controls the corporation. As we shall explain, while 
section 25504 provides a basis for establishing 
liability, it does not provide an independent basis for 
establishing personal jurisdiction. 
Section 25504 states as relevant: 
"Every person who directly or indirectly controls a 
person liable under Section 25501 ..., every principal 
executive officer or director of a corporation so 
liable, ... are also liable jointly and severally with and 
to the same extent as such person, unless the other 
person who is so liable had no knowledge of or 
reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to 
exist." ("Person" is defined as including individuals 
and corporations. (§ 25013).) Section 25501 
specifies the remedies for section 25401 violations. 
Section 25401 makes it unlawful for any person to 
offer or sell a security in California via false 
statements or omissions. The plaintiffs have alleged 
sections 25401 and 25501 as jurisdictional bases in 
their complaint. 
The plaintiffs argue that "the basic facts which form 
the grounds for personal jurisdiction are undisputed: 
(1) securities were issued or caused to be issued in 
California by LES; (2) the securities were offered and 
sold to [the plaintiffs] by way of false or misleading 
statements; and (3) [the defendants moving to quash 
service] were directors and officers of LES at the 
time of the Issuance." Section 25504, plaintiffs argue, 
provides "a presumption of the knowing commission 
of a tort by the officers and directors of an entity 
liable for securities fraud." By virtue of this liability 
under section 25504, plaintiffs assert, the nonresident 
officers and directors have personally committed 
direct acts or omissions in California or acts or 
omissions that had effects in California; this justifies 
California's exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
Bringing the argument full circle, the plaintiffs 
maintain this conduct satisfies the constitutional 
requirement of minimum contacts. 
We disagree with the plaintiffs for two related 
reasons. Two California decisions involving state 
securities law violations, Goehring and Taylor- Rush, 
respectively illustrate these reasons. 
First, the plaintiffs have impermissibly conflated two 
distinct concepts: liability and jurisdiction. " 
'Liability and jurisdiction are independent.' " 
(Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 904-905, 
quoting Sher v. Johnson (9th Cir.1990) 911 F.2d 
1357, 1365.) Liability depends on the relationship 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants; jurisdiction 
depends only upon each defendant's relationship with 
the forum. (Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 
905.) Although individual officers and directors may 
be jointly and severally liable under section 25504 
for their corporation's securities fraud, jurisdiction 
over each defendant must still be established 
individually. (See ibid.) Thus, a California court has 
jurisdiction only over those individual officers and 
directors who have personally established the 
requisite minimum contacts with California. (See 
ibid.) 
*6 Goehring applied this distinction between 
liability and jurisdiction in the analogous context of a 
lawsuit against a partnership and its individual 
partners for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
fraud-based state securities law violations. 
(Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at pp. 900-901.) 
Although recognizing that individual partners are 
jointly and severally liable for the partnership's torts 
and related conduct, Goehring concluded that 
jurisdiction over each partner must still be established 
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individually. (Id. at pp. 904-905.) As another court 
has observed, liability may not be used "as a 
substitute for personal jurisdiction"; "[pjersonal 
jurisdiction has constitutional dimensions, ... and 
regardless of policy goals, [a legislature] cannot 
override the due process clause, the source of 
protection for non- resident defendants." (AT & T Co. 
v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert (9th Cir.1996) 94 
F.3d 586, 590-591.) 
Second, the plaintiffs' argument violates the related 
jurisdictional principle that "[e]ach defendant's 
contacts with the forum State must be assessed 
individually." (Calder, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 790.) 
The mere fact that a state has jurisdiction over a 
nonresident corporation does not mean it necessarily 
has personal jurisdiction over the corporation's 
nonresident officers and directors. (Ibid.; see 
Goehring, supra, 62 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.) 
The Taylor-Rush decision illustrates this principle in 
the context of a lawsuit alleging, similar to the 
lawsuit here, liability under sections 25401 and 
25504. In Taylor-Rush, a California plaintiff sued a 
nonresident corporation and six of its nonresident 
officers and directors for fraud, conspiracy to 
defraud, and liability under sections 25401 and 25504 
based on an alleged fraudulent purchase of securities 
in California. (Taylor-Rush, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 107-108, 113.) The Taylor-Rush court did not 
find personal jurisdiction over the nonresident 
officers and directors by simply invoking section 
25504. Instead, the court analyzed the extent of each 
officer's and director's participation in the challenged 
acts or omissions and how those acts or omissions 
related to California. (Id. at pp. 113-114.) By 
contrast, the plaintiffs' approach here has been to deal 
with the officers and directors collectively rather than 
individually. 
At its core, the plaintiffs' reading of section 25504 
simply equates the corporate positions of the 
nonresident officers and directors with minimum 
contacts on their part. That is not constitutionally 
allowed. As this court stated in Ruger v. Superior 
Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 427, 433, an 
individual's "corporate position as officer [or, we add, 
as director] ... does not supply the missing link for a 
constitutionally cognizable relationship with 
California supplying the basis for personal 
jurisdiction. For personal jurisdiction to lie, the 
character, quality, and nature of [that individual's] 
activity must bear a substantial relationship to the 
causes of action beyond that derived solely from his 
official position with the corporation." In short, the 
plaintiffs' jurisdictional analysis under section 25504 
improperly trumps the constitutional requirement of 
minimum contacts. 
*7 Finally, the plaintiffs' reliance on certain federal 
decisions— construing the federal statute on securities 
violations and control persons-is misplaced. (15 
U.S.C. § 78t; McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd 
(ED.Tex.1999) 46 F.Supp.2d 628; Derensis v. 
Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants 
(D.N.J.1996) 930 F.Supp. 1003; Landry v. Price 
Waterhouse Chartered Accountants (S.D.N.Y.1989) 
715 F.Supp. 98; San Mateo County Transit District v. 
Dearman, Fitzgerald and Roberts, Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 
979 F.2d 1356.) In each of those decisions, save one, 
the finding of personal jurisdiction was based on 
more than a showing that the defendant controlled the 
entity alleged to have violated the securities law; the 
lone exception, the San Mateo decision, has been 
described as "utterly inconsistent" with longstanding 
Supreme Court precedent on personal jurisdiction. (In 
re Baan Co. Securities Litigation (D.D.C.2Q00) 81 
F.Supp.2d 75, 79-82; accord, Tracinda, supra, 197 
F.Supp.2datp. 99.) 
We conclude the plaintiffs have not established 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident officers 
and directors based on section 25504. 
4, Section 25550 
Pulling out all stops, the plaintiffs look to section 
25550 as providing a basis for personal jurisdiction 
over the nonresident officers and directors. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that plaintiffs can raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal, they are wrong on 
the merits. 
Section 25550 provides in relevant part: 
"When any person, including any nonresident of this 
state, engages in conduct prohibited or made 
actionable by this law or any rule or order hereunder, 
whether or not he has filed a consent to service of 
process ..., and personal jurisdiction over him cannot 
otherwise be obtained in this state, that conduct shall 
be considered equivalent to his appointment of the 
commissioner ... to be his attorney to receive service 
of any lawful process in any noncriminal suit, action, 
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or proceeding against him ... which grows out of that Published, (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 976, 977) 
conduct and which is brought under this law or any 
rule or order hereunder, with the same force and END OF DOCUMENT 
validity as if served on him personally. Service may 
be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office 
of the commissioner...." 
Section 25550, as specified by its language and 
chapter heading, is simply a service of process 
statute. Under section 25550, a nonresident who 
"engages in conduct" violating California's securities 
laws is deemed to have appointed the California 
Commissioner of Corporations to receive service of 
process on its behalf regarding that conduct. Section 
25550 does not establish a basis for personal 
jurisdiction. Again, the plaintiffs have confused 
distinct concepts. ITiis time they have confused the 
"basis of personal jurisdiction" over a nonresident 
defendant with "acquiring personal jurisdiction" over 
that defendant. These are different concepts. 
"Personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant 
depends upon the existence of essentially two 
criteria: first, a basis for jurisdiction must exist due to 
[a] defendant's minimum contacts with the forum 
state; second, given that basis for jurisdiction, 
jurisdiction must be acquired'by service of process in 
strict compliance with the requirements of our service 
statutes." (Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior 
Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1229; see also In 
re Marriage of Martin (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1426, 
1431, 1433 [concluding that an analogous service of 
process statute cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction, 
but may be used to acquire jurisdiction if a basis for 
jurisdiction exists].) 
*8 Nor may section 25550 piggyback on section 
25504 to establish personal jurisdiction here; we have 
concluded that section 25504 does not provide a 
jurisdictional basis here. In the end, section 25550, 
viewed alone or with section 25504, cannot supplant 
the constitutional requirement of minimum contacts. 
In light of our resolution, we deny the request for 
judicial notice submitted by defendants Grainger, 
Bullock and Haworth and joined in by Bragagnolo. 
DISPOSITION 
The order quashing service of summons is affirmed. 
We concur: SCOTLAND, P.J., and RAYE, J. 
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